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1 Introduction
In most countries, part of the banking sector is protected through implicit or explicit
government guarantees. Some of these guarantees, such as deposit insurance, affect
all banks more or less in the same way; others privilege a subset of banks, such as
public banks, or large banks that are “too big to fail”. Such asymmetric bail-out
policies are the subject of our study.
Political and academic discussions have focused on the detrimental effects of such
guarantees on the risk-taking behavior of the protected banks. In contrast, the re-
actions of the remaining banks in the banking system have not been dealt with in
the literature. We close this gap by analyzing the competitive effects of government
bail-out policies on those banks that do not enjoy a public guarantee. An under-
standing of other banks’ reactions is indispensable for the judgment of the overall
welfare effects of public bail-out policies.
The relevance of such competitive effects can be illustrated with an example from
Japan. Since the 1990s the profitability of Japanese private banks has been com-
promised by thin interest margins. These have been attributed to the competition
from government financial institutions as well as from (mostly large) banks receiv-
ing disguised subsidies.1 In particular, private banks face strong competition from
Japan’s postal savings system, the biggest deposit taker in the world, which ben-
efits from an explicit government guarantee and tax exemptions and is subject to
limited prudential supervision. The extent of welfare losses arising from this type of
“unfair competition” (see Fukao, p. 25, 2003b) depends essentially on how smaller
private banks adjust their risk-taking in reaction to shrinking profitability due to
the subsidization of public and larger banks.
The relationship between banks’ profit margins and their risk-taking is one of the
central themes in the literature on competition and stability in the banking sec-
tor. The basic idea is that competition tends to reduce rents in the banking sector.
In reaction, banks increase their asset risk because of the well-known risk-shifting
problem described by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Similarly, public bail-out guar-
antees to a subset of banks lead to a reduction of rents at the competitor banks.
Hence there will be a risk-shifting problem at those banks that are not expected
to be bailed out. This effect will be the driving force in our model.2 It should be
noted that the effect of competition on banking stability is sensitive to the way that
banking competition is modeled. As shown by Boyd and De Nicolo´ (2005), there
may be a countervailing effect stemming from loan market competition, as will be
discussed in the robustness section to our model.
1See Fukao (2003a,b) and Kashyap (2002) for an extensive overview of these problems. See also
the diagnosis in the Annual Report of the Bank for International Settlements (2002, pp. 133).
2A similar mechanism has been used by Acharya (2003) to model international spill-overs be-
tween banking systems governed by different regulations. This paper will be discussed in more
detail in the literature review.
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Our starting point is a paper by Allen and Gale (2000, chapter 8.3), in which the
tradeoff between competition and stability is analyzed in a static agency model (see
also Allen and Gale (2004)). Because of its clarity and simplicity, the model is well-
suited to capture the effect of the size of rents on banks’ risk-taking behavior. Like
Allen and Gale, we model competition on the liabilities side of banks’ balance sheets
in a Cournot fashion. However, we modify their model by introducing an asymmetric
government bail-out policy: some banks are bailed out with higher probabilities
than others. In contrast to Allen and Gale, who assume full deposit insurance for
all banks, depositors care about the risk of banks’ assets and demand default premia
in order to be compensated for expected losses from bank insolvencies.
Moreover, we consider two time structures with different patterns of information
revelation:3 In the first model, banks are opaque in the sense that depositors can-
not observe risk before setting deposit rates. Hence, as in Allen and Gale (2000,
chapter 8.3), default premia are set before deposit volumes and risk choices are de-
termined. In the second model, we reverse the timing. Depositors can observe their
bank’s risk choice and the level of deposits before setting default premia. We call
banks transparent in this case.
Our main result is that the government bail-out policy unambiguously leads to
higher risk-taking at banks that do not enjoy a government guarantee. The reason
is that the subsidization induces the protected bank to expand its deposit volume,
no matter whether banks are opaque or transparent. Since deposit volumes are
strategic substitutes in our model, the competitor banks react by decreasing their
deposit volumes. However, the overall effect on aggregate deposits is positive so that
there is an increase in the deposit rate, depressing the competitor banks’ margins
and inducing them to take higher risks.
Another important result concerns the protected bank’s risk-taking. Contrary to
conventional wisdom, the effect of the guarantee on the protected bank appears to
depend on the transparency in the banking sector. In the model with opaque banks,
the protected bank may have lower incentives to take risks, because – as in the work
of Keeley (1990) and Allen and Gale (2000, chapter 8) – the subsidy increases the
bank’s rents. With transparent banks, risk-taking unambiguously increases in the
bail-out probability. Here, the argument is similar to that in the literature discussing
excessive risk-taking in the context of unfairly priced deposit insurance.
The implications for welfare are ambiguous. Within the setup of our model, a
government bail-out policy may increase or decrease welfare ex ante, depending,
among other things, on the information structure in the banking sector. Hence
welfare effects are much more complicated than suggested by public discussions of
government bail-out policies.
3Matutes and Vives (2000) use similar time structures in their analysis of the tradeoff between
competition and stability.
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The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 contains a brief review of the related
literature. In section 3, we derive the competitive effects of an asymmetric bail-
out policy for the cases of opaque and transparent banks. In both models, we first
analyze the monopoly case with a single bank; we then consider the oligopoly case
where banks have different bail-out probabilities. Welfare implications are discussed
for each model, and a number of checks for robustness are carried out. Section 4
summarizes our major findings and discusses empirical and normative implications.
Proofs are given in the appendix.
2 Related literature
Our paper is related to two strands of literature: first, to the extensive literature
on competition and stability in the banking sector; and second, to the literature on
the effects of public bail-out guarantees.
A paper by Keeley (1990) was the first of a large number of papers to establish
the trade-off between competition and stability in the banking sector. In a simple
model, Keeley shows that the reduction of rents through competition exacerbates the
risk-shifting problem at banks caused by limited liability or unfairly priced deposit
insurance.4 Hence, the creation of “charter value” (i. e. the present discounted value
of future rents) through restrictions on competition can induce banks to refrain
from overly risky behavior if the expected loss of the charter value is larger than the
expected gains from increased risk-taking. Hellmann, Murdoch, and Stiglitz (2000)
and Repullo (2004) discuss regulatory responses.
The work by Keeley has been extended in a number of ways, with differing con-
clusions about the existence of the presumed tradeoff. Allen and Gale (2000, chap-
ter 8.3) generalize Keeley’s results in a static agency model, confirming the negative
relationship between competition and stability. While the tradeoff appears to be
robust to the introduction of product differentiation (see Matutes and Vives (2000)
and Cordella and Yeyati (2002)), it may break down in the presence of competition
in loan markets (and not just deposit markets) (see Koskela and Stenbacka (2000),
Caminal and Matutes (2002), and Boyd and De Nicolo´ (2005)). Dynamic models
yield contradictory results (see Hellmann, Murdoch, and Stiglitz (2000), Perotti and
Suarez (2002), Repullo (2004), and Allen and Gale (2000, chapter 8.4)).
Similar to the theoretical literature, the empirical literature yields ambiguous results
about the trade-off between competition and stability. Keeley (1990) presents some
4This literature review is restricted to the papers most closely related to ours. For more detailed
surveys on the relationship between competition and stability in banking, see Canoy, van Dijk,
Lemmen, de Mooij, and Weigand (2001) and Carletti and Hartmann (2003). Allen and Gale (2004)
provide a useful overview of what type of models tends to yield what type of results regarding the
sign of the relationship between competition and stability.
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evidence for the view that the surge in bank failures in the 1980s in the United
States may be explained by the disappearance of monopoly rents in banking due
to financial deregulation. Similarly, the accumulation of systemic banking crises in
developed and developing countries in the past two decades has been attributed to
financial liberalization, which has also been shown to be accompanied by declin-
ing charter values in banking (see Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1999)). In a
similar vein, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2004) find that banks’ interest
margins are higher in countries with tighter restrictions on competition in bank-
ing. In contrast, a recent cross-country study by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine
(2003) shows that systemic banking crises are less likely in countries with more con-
centrated banking sectors, but more likely in countries with tighter restrictions on
entry and banking activities. These findings are inconsistent with the “charter value
hypothesis,” according to which crises should be less likely in the latter case as well.
De Nicolo´, Bartholomew, Zaham, and Zephirin (2003) find that the probability of
the failure of the five largest banks is positively correlated with bank concentration.
This also contradicts the charter value hypothesis.
The second strand of literature related to our paper concerns the effects of public
bail-out guarantees. With respect to public banks, the literature is scarce. The
most important empirical findings are that government ownership of banks is per-
vasive all over the world and that it tends to be associated with poorly operating
financial systems and slower growth performance (see Barth, Caprio, and Levine
(2001) and La Porta, de Silanes, and Shleifer (2002)). The evidence on the relation-
ship between the governmental ownership of banks and banking stability is mixed.
Caprio and Martinez Peria (2000) find that government ownership tends to increase
bank fragility. In contrast, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) show that government
ownership has no robust impact on bank fragility, once one controls for banking
regulation and supervisory practices.
There exist a fairly large number of papers on the so-called “too-big-to-fail” (here-
after TBTF) problem. Large banks may be subject to an incentive problem because
the public authorities cannot credibly commit to not supporting these banks when
failure is impending. The effects on risk-taking are similar to the ones discussed in
the deposit insurance literature. In fact, a TBTF policy can be described as a com-
plete insurance of all deposits and other liabilities at zero costs. Since Merton (1977),
it has been well-known that unfair deposit insurance entails a risk-shifting problem,
similar to the problem arising from limited liability.5 Hence one may expect that
a more concentrated banking sector with TBTF banks entails higher risk-taking at
the largest banks, and thus higher fragility.6 Since a higher concentration implies
5See Matutes and Vives (1996, 2000) for theoretical analyses of the relationship between deposit
insurance, competition and bank stability. Empirical evidence for the adverse effects of deposit
insurance on banking stability has been presented by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002).
6Erlenmaier and Gersbach (2001) show that, in the absence of risk-shifting problems, a TBTF
policy dominates random bail-out schemes in terms of welfare, whereas the random scheme leads
to higher stability.
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less competition, this result is just the opposite of what would be predicted by the
“charter value literature” described above.7 Our paper aims to resolve this apparent
contradiction.
The TBTF problem also seems to be an empirically relevant phenomenon. Boyd and
Gertler (1994) document a TBTF problem at the largest commercial banks in the
United States in the 1980s. Schnabel (2004, 2005) describes a similar phenomenon
at the so-called “great banks” in Germany at the time of the Great Depression.
The episode studied most intensively is the near-failure of Continental Illinois in
1984 and the consequent public announcement by regulators that the 11 largest US
banks were too big to be allowed to fail. In an event study, O’Hara and Shaw (1990)
find significant positive abnormal returns for TBTF banks after the announcement.
This is consistent with the existence of a positive subsidy to TBTF banks. Studies
using bond market data tend to confirm the existence of conjectural government
guarantees (seeFlannery and Sorescu (1996) and Morgan and Stiroh (2002)).
Another strand of the empirical literature looks at the question whether the prospect
of becoming TBTF is a motivation for bank mergers.8 While Benston, Hunter, and
Wall (1995) reject this hypothesis for the years 1981 to 1986, the evidence for the
1990s in Kane (2000) and Penas and Unal (2001) is consistent with the hypothesis.
The main difference between bail-out policies and deposit insurance is that the for-
mer affect different banks asymmetrically if bailout probabilities differ across banks.
To our knowledge, there exists no paper that explicitly models this asymmetry in the
context of a domestic banking system with heterogeneous banks. The only related
empirical finding is by O’Hara and Shaw (1990) who find negative effects on banks
not included in the list of banks deemed to be “too big to fail;” they attribute this
finding to the self-financing character of the deposit insurance system.
The paper most closely related to ours is the one by Acharya (2003) on the desirabil-
ity of an international convergence of capital adequacy regulation. Acharya models
the asymmetric treatment of banks across banking systems governed by different
regulations. Similar to our paper, the differences in bail-out probabilities across
countries may lead to competitive spill-overs. However, Acharya does not model
competition explicitly, but he assumes spill-overs through the banks’ (nonmonetary)
cost functions, which he interprets as competitive effects. In contrast, our model
explicitly incorporates an industrial organization model of banking. Interestingly,
the two models yield quite different results, as will be pointed out below.
7The possibility of risk reduction through the commitment to a bail-out policy has also been
noted by Cordella and Yeyati (2003).
8This argument is similar to the dynamic arguments in the literature on competition and sta-
bility. It was first stated by Hunter and Wall (1989) and Boyd and Graham (1991).
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3 The model
The basic setup of our model is similar to that in Allen and Gale (2000, chapter 8.3).
We consider an economy with n chartered banks, indexed by i = 1, . . . , n. Bank i
collects deposits di and invests them in a risky project. Projects yield a return yi
per invested unit with probability p(yi), otherwise they return zero. The success
probability is a decreasing and concave function of the target return, i. e. p′(yi) < 0,
and p′′(yi) ≤ 0. Each bank can choose the “risk level” of its investment by fixing
yi. The aggregate amount of deposits in the economy is D =
∑n
i=1 di. Depositors
demand an expected return R(D), with R′(D) > 0 and R′′(D) ≥ 0. Banks and
depositors are assumed to be risk neutral.
So far the model is identical to that used by Allen and Gale (2000, chapter 8.3).
However, Allen and Gale assume that deposits are fully insured, so that depositors
do not need to be concerned about default probabilities. In contrast, we assume that
bank i is bailed out by the government with probability βi ∈ [0; 1] in the case of
failure.9 The government can commit itself to this (exogenous) bail-out probability.
Given this, depositors are repaid with probability p(yi) + βi (1 − p(yi)), while with
probability (1−βi) (1− p(yi)), they receive nothing. In order to obtain an expected
return of R(D), they demand a nominal return of ρi R(D); the “default premium”
ρi will depend on βi and yi.
The expected profit of bank i consists of three factors: the probability of success
p(yi), the deposit volume di, and some “margin” given by the difference between
yi and the nominal repayment ρi R(D). It hence is a function of four endogenous
variables, namely its risk level yi, its default premium ρi, its deposit volume di, and
the competitors’ deposit volume D−i =
∑
k =i dk = D − di,
Πi(yi, ρi, di, D−i) = p(yi) [yi di − ρi R(di + D−i) di]
= p(yi) di [yi − ρi R(D)]. (1)
Within this setting, we define two games characterized by the degrees of transparency
in the banking sector, modeled through different time patterns of actions and in-
formation revelation (similar to Matutes and Vives (2000)). In each game, we first
discuss the monopoly case with n = 1. This yields insights into the banks’ incen-
tives to take risks and expand volume, abstracting from competitive effects. These
insights will be useful in the subsequent analysis of the oligopoly case. Finally, we
will briefly discuss welfare implications and carry out some robustness checks.
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Figure 1: Time structure when banks are opaque
• Depositors (anticipating di and yi) set the default premia ρi.
• Banks (knowing ρi) choose di and yi; R(D) is determined in the deposit
market.
• Projects mature and return yi with probability p(yi). Banks pay
ρi R(D) to their depositors if possible. Otherwise, the government
pays ρi R(D) with probability βi.
3.1 Opaque banks
In the first model, depositors set the default premia ρi before banks choose their
deposit volumes di and their target returns yi (see figure 1). This means that
depositors cannot exert any market discipline because they cannot react to the
actual risk-taking of banks, which is revealed only after depositors have set the
default premia. Therefore, we call banks opaque in this case. The model structure is
equivalent to a commitment problem, in which banks cannot commit to a particular
risk level. If there were a possibility for commitment or if the risk-taking of banks
were contractible, depositors could discipline banks by demanding default premia
that increase with risk-taking. This time structure generates a moral hazard problem
between depositors and banks, known as risk-shifting or asset substitution.
3.1.1 Monopoly
To abstract from competitive effects, we first look at the case with only one bank
(n = 1), so that D = d1. For readability, we omit all indices. As usual, we analyze
the problem backwards. First, we determine d and y for given ρ. The implicit
equations for optimal d and y are
∂Π
∂d
= p(y)
[
y − ρ [R(d) + dR′(d)]] = 0 and (2)
∂Π
∂y
= d
[
p(y) + [y − ρR(d)] p′(y)] = 0. (3)
If a solution to (2) and (3) exists, it is unique given our assumptions on R(d) and
p(y), yielding the implicit functions d(ρ) and y(ρ). Then we can derive the following
lemma.
9Depositors in our model should be thought of as investors who are not (fully) insured through
a deposit insurance scheme. Because of the risk neutrality of depositors, βi can also be interpreted
as the fraction of deposits that the government refunds in the case of bank failure.
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Lemma 1 (Optimal d and y for given ρ) The optimal deposit volume d decrea-
ses in the default premium ρ, i. e. d′(ρ) < 0. The optimal risk level y rises in the
default premium (y′(ρ) > 0) if and only if
R′(d) d
R(d)
< 1 + d
R′′(d)
R′(d)
. (4)
Intuitively, a rise in ρ results in a decline in the bank’s profit margin y−ρR(d). The
bank can react in two ways to compensate for this decline: It can either decrease its
volume d, implying a fall in the deposit rate R(d) and an overall contraction; or it
can raise y, at the cost of a falling success probability p(y). Lemma 1 tells us that
the bank will always decide to shrink. In contrast, the bank’s risk-taking behavior
depends on the inverse elasticity of the deposit supply (see the left hand side of (4)).
Risk-taking increases in the default premium, if the inverse elasticity is sufficiently
small, or if the elasticity of the deposit supply is sufficiently large. Hence, if the
deposit rate reacts only weakly to a decline in deposits, the bank will increase risk.
However, it will decrease risk if the inverse elasticity is large.
Now we turn to the determination of ρ. Anticipating d and y, depositors set a
default premium ρ to obtain an expected return of R(d), yielding
ρ =
1
p(y) + β (1− p(y)) . (5)
We can now characterize the effects of bail-out policies. An increase in β (i. e. the
bank is bailed out with a higher probability) leads to a decrease in ρ. As shown by
lemma 1, this induces the bank to expand (d rises), whereas the effect on risk-taking
y depends on the elasticity of deposit supply. In turn, the reaction of y feeds back
into ρ. The following proposition describes the overall reaction of ρ, d, and y.
Proposition 1 (Effects of bail-out policy in monopoly) In an opaque monop-
olistic banking system, an increase in the bail-out probability induces depositors to
demand a lower default premium, ∂ρ/∂β < 0. The bank reacts by choosing a higher
deposit volume, ∂d/∂β > 0. It chooses a higher risk level (∂y/∂β > 0) if and only
if y′(ρ) is negative, i. e. if the supply of deposits is sufficiently inelastic.
An increase in β implies that depositors are compensated with a higher probability
(or to a higher degree) when there is a bank failure. According to the proposition,
this reduces the default premium even after taking into account feedback effects. The
results on d and y follow directly from lemma 1. As before, the effect on risk-taking
is ambiguous and depends on the elasticity of the deposit supply. In particular,
risk-taking increases only if the supply of deposits is sufficiently inelastic. This
ambiguous result contradicts the conventional wisdom according to which a higher
bail-out probability always leads to an increase in risk-taking.10
10This result also contradicts proposition 1 in Acharya’s (2003) paper. In fact, the deposit
volumes and risk-taking of banks always move in the same directions in that paper. This is driven
8
3.1.2 Oligopoly
Assume now that n banks have been chartered instead of just one. We are interested
in how the market as a whole reacts when the government changes the bail-out policy
for one bank. Without a loss of generality, assume that the government raises the
bail-out probability β1 of bank 1.
Assume for the moment that the deposit volume D−1 of competitor banks is given.
Then proposition 1 implies that, just as in the monopoly case, the increase in β1
leads to a fall in the default premium ρ1. This induces bank 1 to increase its volume
d1. The question then is how bank 1’s behavior affects the remaining banking sector.
In our model, banks interact only in the deposit market, namely through the deposit
rate R(D). In equilibrium, the deposit volume of each bank must be an optimal
reaction to the volume choices of all competitors. Lemma 2 summarizes the strategic
interactions in the deposit market.
Lemma 2 (Strategic interactions in the deposit market) The reaction func-
tion dj(D−j) of any bank j is a strictly decreasing function. Starting from an equi-
librium with positive deposit volumes at all banks, an outward shift of one bank’s
reaction function leads to an increase in that bank’s deposit volume and a decrease
in competitor banks’ deposit volumes. The former effect dominates the latter, hence
aggregate deposits D increase.
The first part of lemma 2 implies that deposit volumes are strategic substitutes
in our model. Figure 2 plots the reaction functions for a numerical example.11
From proposition 1, we know that the reaction function of bank 1 shifts outward
as β1 increases, while the reaction functions of the competitors remain unchanged.
The second part of lemma 2 implies that an increase in β1 leads to an expansion
of deposits at the subsidized bank and a contraction of deposits at the remaining
banks. Finally, the overall effect is an expansion of the aggregate deposit volume.
This last point is crucial: It means that the market rate R(D) increases, implying
higher risk-taking by the competitor banks due to shrinking margins. The following
proposition sums up actions and reactions of bank 1 and its competitors.
Proposition 2 (Competitive effects of bail-out policy) In an opaque banking
system, an increase in the bail-out probability β1 leads to
1. an expansion of deposits at bank 1 and a contraction of deposits at its com-
petitor banks j = 1, ∂d1/∂β1 > 0 and ∂dj/∂β1 < 0;
by his assumption that there is only one risky investment opportunity, and not a continuous risk
choice as in our model.
11In the example used in the figures, condition (4) is satisfied with equality, so there is no effect
on risk-taking in the monopoly case. The effects on risk-taking observed in the oligopoly case can
hence be attributed to competitive effects alone.
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Figure 2: Reaction functions in the deposit market for varying β1
d1
d2
d∗1(d2)
d∗2(d1)
0.1
0.1
The graph is based on the functions p(y) = 1 − y and R(d) = d. For comparability,
the same functions are used throughout the paper. Here and in the following graphs,
we consider an oligopoly with two banks. Black lines stand for β1 = β2 = 0.1, the
gray line for β1 = 0.13. The equilibria are indicated by dotted lines. Notice that the
increase in d1 is larger than the decrease in d2, so that aggregate deposits increase.
2. an increase or decrease in risk at bank 1, depending on the elasticity of the
deposit supply; in all cases where risk decreases in the monopoly, it decreases
also in the oligopoly, while the opposite is not true; in either case, the default
premium falls, ∂ρ1/∂β1 < 0;
3. an increase in risk at the competitor banks j, accompanied by higher default
premia, ∂yj/∂β1 > 0 and ∂ρj/∂β1 > 0.
The most notable results are the ones on risk-taking: There is an unambiguous
increase in the risk-taking of the competitor banks in response to a higher bail-out
probability of one bank, whereas the risk at the protected bank may increase or
decrease.12 In fact, there is a lower tendency for the protected bank to take risks
than when there is a monopoly.
Proposition 2 is illustrated in figure 3 for a numerical example with two banks. As
the bail-out probability β1 rises, bank 1 raises its deposit volume. At the same time,
bank 2 is crowded out. Due to a lower nominal deposit rate ρ1 R(D), bank 1 reduces
its riskiness. For bank 2, the nominal rate rises, leading to higher risk-taking. If bail-
out policies become too asymmetric, the less protected bank’s incentives to take risks
become overwhelming, inducing depositors to demand ever higher default premia,
12The result on the risk-taking of competitor banks here again differs from the effect discussed in
Acharya (2003). There, the risk-taking of the banks in one country may also decrease in reaction
to higher forbearance in another country.
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Figure 3: Effects of an asymmetric bail-out policy
β1
DuopolyMon.→ Mon.
β20 1
d y
β1
DuopolyMon.→ Mon.
β20
1
1
Solid lines stand for bank 1, dashed lines for a competitor bank 2. In this example,
β2 = 0.25, so for β1 = 0.25, both banks are symmetric (gray vertical line).
which in turn fuel risk-taking, so that the process reaches no new equilibrium. The
less protected bank closes. If there are only two banks initially, the other bank is
left with a monopoly as described in section 3.1.1. At that point, deposits at the
remaining bank jump up and risk-taking drops.
3.1.3 Welfare considerations
We now briefly discuss some welfare implications of our model. A fully-fledged
welfare analysis is beyond the scope of this paper because we have not modeled the
benefits of bail-outs, such as the avoidance of contagion and systemic crises. Also,
distortions from taxation to finance bail-outs would have to be taken into account.
Three factors in our model are relevant for welfare assessments: risk-taking, the level
of deposits, and the entrance or exit of banks. Banks’ repayments to depositors and
the bail-out payments from the government are welfare-neutral in our model.
Let us consider the increase in the bail-out probability of one bank. In the case
of a relatively inelastic deposit supply, welfare is reduced by the overall increase
in risk-taking, which is always excessive in this model. If the deposit supply is
sufficiently elastic, the effect of risk-taking on welfare is ambiguous. The aggregate
increase in deposits tends to increase welfare as long as expected returns yi p(yi)
outweigh R(D). However, banks may grow excessively due to subsidization through
bail-outs; then an expansion of deposits reduces welfare. Finally, an asymmetric
bail-out policy may crowd out the least protected banks completely, leading to a
drop in the risk-taking of the remaining banks and in aggregate deposits. The effect
of banks’ exit on welfare depends on the relative impact of the deposit contraction
and risk reduction. Given the multitude of effects going in different directions, the
overall effect of bail-out policies is ambiguous in the opaque model.
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Figure 4: Time structure when banks are transparent
• Banks (anticipating ρi) choose di and yi.
• Depositors (knowing di and yi) set the default premia ρi; R(D) is
determined in the deposit market.
• Projects mature and return yi with probability p(yi). Banks pay
ρi R(D) to their depositors if possible. Otherwise, the government
pays ρi R(D) with probability βi.
3.2 Transparent banks
In our second model, the time structure is reversed (see figure 4), so that depositors
observe banks’ risk choices before setting default premia. Here depositors can (and
do) exert market discipline. We call banks transparent in this case. In making their
risk choices, banks take into account that they will be punished for excessive risk-
taking. Again the model could alternatively be phrased in terms of a commitment
problem. If banks could commit to a certain risk level or if risk-taking were con-
tractible, default premia would depend directly on the level of risk-taking, exerting
discipline on banks.
We assume that the government does not condition its policy on banks’ risk levels
yi. This assumption may be motivated by the time inconsistency problem that the
government faces. Banks are bailed out because this is ex post optimal for the
economy, even if they have taken excessive risks before they failed. An exogenous,
unconditional bail-out probability may be a good approximation of such a policy.
The disciplining effect of this time structure can be seen most clearly in the extreme
case of βi = 0, i. e. the bank is never bailed out. In this case, depositors demand
a default premium ρi = 1/p(yi), and expected profits of the bank are given by
Πi = di (yi p(yi) − R(D)). Then the bank’s optimal yi is equal to the first-best
solution because the bank itself must bear the entire cost from excessive risk-taking.
If βi > 0, there is again a risk-shifting problem because the costs of the implicit
government guarantee are not completely borne by the bank. To keep our proofs
tractable, we assume that R(D) and p(yi) are linear.
13 Furthermore, we assume that
βi > 0 is not too large, i. e., βi ≈ 0. In section 3.3, we will discuss the robustness of
our results to these assumptions.
13This assumption is stronger than actually needed. A sufficient assumption would be that R(D)
and p(yi) do not bend too much in the neighborhood of the equilibrium.
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3.2.1 Monopoly
Again, we start with the case of a monopolistic bank to abstract from competitive
effects. First, we determine the default premium ρ, taking the level of deposits d
and the bank’s risk choice y as given. The expression for ρ looks exactly the same
as in (5),
ρ =
1
p(y) + β (1− p(y)) . (6)
If β is smaller than one, depositors charge a higher default premium for higher y.
In the extreme case, with β = 1, the default premium is independent of the chosen
risk level, with ρ = 1. In contrast, the default premium does not directly depend on
the deposit volume. Furthermore, ρ depends negatively on the bail-out probability
β. We can directly incorporate the default premium into the profit function (1),
Π = p(y) d
(
y − R(d)
p(y) + β (1− p(y))
)
. (7)
Now we determine the optimal deposit volume d and risk level y by maximizing (7),
∂Π
∂d
= p(y)[y − ρ(y) [R(d) + dR′(d)]] != 0, (8)
∂Π
∂y
= d
[
p′(y) [y − ρ(y)R(d)] + p(y) [1− ρ′(y)R(d)] ] != 0. (9)
If a solution to (8) and (9) exists, it is unique given our assumptions on R(d) and
p(y). The two first-order conditions yield the implicit functions d(y) and y(d). The
equilibrium is given by the intersection of these two functions. We are interested in
the reactions of the optimal d and y to a change in β.
For given d and y, the default premium ρ will decrease if β increases. This means
that risk-taking becomes less costly for the bank. Therefore, it will increase risk in
anticipation of the less severe punishment for risk-taking. The decrease in ρ and
the increase in y increase the bank’s margin, which induces the bank to increase its
deposit volume. At the same time, larger margins tend to lower risk, leading to a
countervailing effect on y. Moreover, the changes in y feed back into the default
premium ρ. The following proposition characterizes the overall effects of an increase
in the bail-out probability on the equilibrium choices of ρ, d, and y.
Proposition 3 (Effects of bail-out policy in monopoly) In a transparent mo-
nopolistic banking system, an increase in the bail-out probability induces the bank to
raise its deposit volume d and its risk level y, i. e. ∂d/∂β > 0 and ∂y/∂β > 0.
The default premium ρ decreases (∂ρ/∂β < 0) if R(d) is small enough (i. e. if
R(d) < 2 y p(y) (1− p(y))).
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The proposition shows that the direct effect on risk always dominates the indirect
effects. The monopolistic bank increases its risk in reaction to the subsidization by
the government because part of the potential losses can be shifted to the government.
The effect on ρ is ambiguous: The rise in β tends to lower ρ, whereas the rise in
y tends to raise ρ. Proposition 3 states that the effect of β dominates for small
R(d).14 Finally, the overall effect on the bank’s margin is positive, inducing the
bank to expand its deposit volume.
3.2.2 Oligopoly
Now we turn to the oligopoly case with n banks. Analytically, we simultaneously
solve the system of equations (∂Πi/∂di = 0)i and (∂Πi/∂yi = 0)i, i = 1, . . . , n.
Again we assume without loss of generality that the government raises β1.
The chain of reactions is almost identical to the one in the opaque model in sec-
tion 3.1.2. There is a direct effect on bank 1, as described in proposition 3. Thereby,
the rise in β1 leads to an increase in bank 1’s risk and deposit volume, taking the de-
posit volumes of competitors as given. As before, the behavior of bank 1 spills over
to the other banks through the deposit market. Lemma 3 describes the strategic
interactions in the deposit market.
Lemma 3 (Strategic interactions in the deposit market) The reaction func-
tion dj(D−j) of any bank j is a strictly decreasing function. Starting from an equi-
librium with positive deposit volumes at all banks, an outward shift of one bank’s
reaction function leads to an increase in that bank’s deposit volume and a decrease
in competitor banks’ deposit volumes. The former effect dominates the latter, hence
aggregate deposits D increase.
This lemma is identical to lemma 2, and so are the mechanisms at work. As before,
deposit volumes are strategic substitutes. In fact, banks’ reactions functions look
like the ones in figure 2, with slightly different slopes. Hence an increase in d1 is
again accompanied by a decrease in dj for j = 1. The overall effect on total deposits
is positive. As a result, the market rate rises, and competitors’ risk levels increase
accordingly. Proposition 4 summarizes the reactions of bank 1 and its competitors
to an increasing bail-out probability of bank 1.
Proposition 4 (Competitive effects of bail-out policy) In a transparent bank-
ing system, an increase in the bail-out probability β1 leads to
14Note that the condition given in the proposition applies to the case where β is small and y is
close to the first-best level of risk. For larger β, the condition may be overly restrictive. In our
numerical simulations, ρ decreases in β globally, even when the condition is violated.
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Figure 5: Effects of an asymmetric bail-out policy
d
β1β2
0
0 1
y
β1β2
1st best
0 1
Solid lines stand for bank 1, dashed lines for a competitor bank 2. In this example,
β2 = 0.35, so for β1 = 0.35, both banks are identical.
1. an expansion of deposits at bank 1, and a contraction of deposits at its com-
petitor banks j = 1, i. e. ∂d1/∂β1 > 0 and ∂dj/∂β1 < 0;
2. an increase in risk at bank 1, i. e. ∂y1/∂β1 > 0; the default premium decreases
(∂ρ1/∂β1 < 0) if R(D) is small enough;
3. an increase in risk at the competitor banks j, accompanied by higher default
premia if βj > 0, i. e. ∂yj/∂β1 > 0 and ∂ρj/∂β1 > 0; for βj = 0, yj and ρj are
constant.
The proposition is illustrated in figure 5 for the case of two banks. As the bail-out
probability β1 rises, bank 1 expands, while bank j is crowded out. Since the increase
in d1 is larger than the decrease in dj, the aggregate deposit volume increases, leading
to a higher market rate R(D). As a result, the risk-shifting problem at bank j is
exacerbated. In the case of transparent banks, y1 also increases unambiguously.
Interestingly, the effect of competition on risk-taking may be even stronger than the
direct effect: For large β1, y2 exceeds y1 in the numerical example.
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The most important result is that the competitive effects of the bail-out policy on
the remaining banking sector are independent of the time and information structure
of the model: In both of our models, the subsidized bank expands, causing a rise in
the market rate, which aggravates the risk-shifting problems at competitor banks.
3.2.3 Welfare considerations
The factors affecting welfare are the same as in the opaque banking system. Again
we consider an increase in the bail-out probability of one bank. In the transparent
15To demonstrate this possibility, we chose a different β2 in the graphs than in the model with
opaque banks. For β2 = 0.25, the two curves just touch at β1 = 1.
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model, the increase in risk-taking at all banks clearly decreases welfare. The effect
of an expansion of deposits is again ambiguous. However, the welfare gain due to
the aggregate deposit expansion can outweigh the welfare losses from excessive risk-
taking only if the number of banks is small. If the economy is sufficiently competitive
(i. e. n is sufficiently large), welfare will decrease even for small β. Finally, less
protected banks may leave the market if asymmetries become too large. Summing
up, bail-out policies tend to decrease welfare in the transparent model if the number
of banks in the system is sufficiently large.
3.3 Robustness
In this section, we discuss various extensions of our model to check whether our
results are robust when the main assumptions are relaxed.
Loan market competition Our model assumes that banking competition is tak-
ing place in the market for deposits only. However, Boyd and De Nicolo´ (2005) have
shown that the impact of banking competition on stability may be reversed if one
allows for loan market competition.
Boyd and De Nicolo´ point out that the relationship between banking competition
and stability depends on whether banks are facing a portfolio problem or an optimal
contracting problem. Most papers on the trade-off between competition and stability
have used the first approach, where banks directly choose the riskiness of their
portfolios. In contrast, the second approach assumes that the banks’ borrowers, not
the banks themselves, choose among projects, and face a moral hazard problem.
Boyd and De Nicolo´ show that the relationship between competition and stability
may be positive in that case.
Let us discuss both approaches in the context of our model. For the sake of simplicity,
we abstract from deposit market competition. If banks face a portfolio problem,
the introduction of loan market competition does not alter our main results. The
protection of one bank lowers its refinancing costs, and causes it to become more
aggressive in the loan market. The protected bank grows, whereas the remaining
banks shrink. Overall, the loan volume will rise, and loan rates will drop. The
risk-taking behavior of the protected bank will depend on the transparency of the
system, just as in our model. The competitor banks get lower profit margins, which
induces them to take more risk, independent of transparency.
If banks face an optimal contracting problem, our results are overturned. For the
same reasons as above, the protection of one bank will induce a drop in loan rates.
However, this drop induces the banks’ borrowers to take fewer risks. This reduces
the portfolio risk at all banks, independent of the transparency of the system.
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Summing up, our model is robust to the introduction of loan market competition as
long as banks face a portfolio problem. However, the results are overturned if banks
face an optimal contracting problem. In reality, both types of problems may be
relevant. In such a setting, the aggregate result will depend on the relative strength
of the two effects.
Price competition Another extension is to model the strategic interactions among
banks as price competition with product differentiation or transportation costs.16
We believe that, in such a model, the protected bank’s risk-taking behavior would
still depend on the system’s transparency, and that competitor banks would again
be pushed towards higher risk-taking.
Suppose, for example, that banks are located on a Salop circle and that the bail-out
probability of one bank increases. Then for given deposit rates of the competitors,
the protected bank is in a local monopoly, hence it should react as discussed in
the monopoly sections 3.1.1 and 3.2.1: It becomes more aggressive, and risk-taking
should depend on transparency. As a result, the neighboring banks find themselves
threatened by more competition from the protected bank. They may react by in-
creasing their deposit rates to regain some “territory.” This effect spills over to
the neighbors of the neighbors, and so forth. In equilibrium, all competitor banks
lose some territory and increase their deposit rates; this is accompanied by higher
risk-taking.
Continuous variation of transparency So far, we have looked at two extreme
cases of bank transparency. In section 3.1, banks were perfectly opaque, so that risk
choices were not observable at all; in section 3.2, banks were perfectly transparent,
and risk was observable without any distortion. We now discuss what happens in
the range between the two extremes.
Assume the following time structure: Banks fix their risk levels yi before depositors
set their default premia ρi. However, depositors learn yi only with probability η.
Then for η = 0, we are back in the perfectly opaque case, whereas for η = 1,
banks are perfectly transparent. Instead of solving this model formally, we have
run a large number of simulations. All these simulations confirm our main results:
The competitor banks increase their risk, independently of η. In addition, higher
transparency amplifies the risk-taking of protected banks in reaction to a higher
bail-out probability. Formally, the simulations suggest that the cross-derivative
∂2y1/∂β1∂η is positive.
16This has been done by Matutes and Vives (2000) and Cordella and Yeyati (2002), however
without considering government bail-outs.
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Tractability assumptions In the section on transparent banks, we have proven
the main results only under the assumptions of linear R(D) and p(y), and small β.
Therefore, we ran a large number of simulations to support the claim that our main
results still hold in the case of strictly convex R(D), strictly concave p(y), and large
β. Again the simulations confirmed our main results: If the protection of one bank
increases, all competitors shrink and take more risks; the risk-taking behavior of the
protected bank depends on the transparency of the system.
Dynamic model Our static model neglects the incentive effects arising from the
banks’ charter values in a dynamic setting. A simple iteration yields a dynamic
version of our model. Then, the expectation of future profits may induce banks to
refrain from risk-taking. An increase in the bail-out probability of one bank increases
the protected bank’s current and future profits, and hence its “charter value.” As
a result, this bank will show an even lower tendency for risk-taking than in the
one-shot game. This implies that, even in a transparent setting, in response to more
protection the protected bank may take fewer risks. In contrast, the current and
future profits of the unprotected banks drop, implying a decline in charter values.
Therefore, the incentives of the unprotected banks for higher risk-taking are still
reinforced. Even in a multi-period setting, the protection of one bank will increase
the risk-taking of the competitor banks.
Endogenous bail-out probabilities Finally, we have assumed that bail-out
probabilities are exogenous. In the case of public banks, this assumption seems
to be reasonable. However, in the case of a “too-big-to-fail” policy, the bail-out
probability should depend on the size of banks. We believe that our results are
reinforced if bail-out probabilities depend on size. In that case, we would get an ad-
ditional strategic effect. Since high bail-out probabilities are beneficial for banks, a
strategic tendency towards increased volume would develop. This raises the deposit
rate, exacerbating the risk-shifting problem.
4 Conclusion
We have started from the question of how government bail-out policies affect compe-
tition in the banking sector. While the existing literature has focused on the effects
of bail-out policies on the bank that enjoys the public guarantee, we are mainly in-
terested in the competitive effects of such policies on the remaining banking sector.
We have presented two models, differing with respect to their time and information
structures. In the first model, with opaque banks, risk-taking is unobservable by de-
positors. Therefore, a bank’s risk choice does not directly affect its refinancing costs.
In the second model, with transparent banks, investments are perfectly observable.
As a consequence, deposit rates react promptly to a bank’s risk choice.
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Our main contribution has been in showing that an increase in the bail-out probabil-
ity of one bank unambiguously leads to an increase in the risk-taking of the competi-
tor banks. At the same time, competitor banks are crowded out. The competitive
effects are particularly strong in an opaque setting. This is due to a multiplier effect,
which reinforces the original effect of risk-taking on the default premium through
the feedback from the default premium on risk-taking.
The effect on the protected bank’s risk-taking depends, among other things, on the
degree of transparency in the banking system. If banks are opaque, the protected
bank may take less risk, while it always assumes more risk in a transparent en-
vironment (at least in a static setting). This adds a qualification to the existing
literature, which suggests that an increase in the bail-out probability always leads
to higher risk-taking at the protected bank. The welfare effects of bail-out policies
are ambiguous. Welfare may increase or decrease, depending on the transparency
of the banking system, the degree of competition within the system, the degree of
protection, and the asymmetry of banks.
Our results have proven to be robust to a number of modifications. The only caveat
concerns the modeling of banking competition (see Boyd and De Nicolo´ (2005)): If
there is loan market competition and banks’ behavior is best described by an optimal
contracting problem, an increase in the bail-out probability of one bank may make
all banks less risky.
Our paper raises interesting empirical issues, concerning e. g. the role of transparency
for banking stability. Most empirical studies on the risk-taking of large banks find
that these banks tend to be riskier than smaller banks (e. g. De Nicolo´ (2000) and
Boyd and Graham (1998)). However, most of these studies have used data on de-
veloped countries, which may be expected to have a higher degree of transparency.
One interesting question for future research is whether the risk behavior of protected
banks depends on the transparency of the system. Moreover, our results may help
to interpret some of the findings of Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2003). If the
indicators of the institutional quality in banking used in that study measure trans-
parency (or market discipline), rather than competition, it is not surprising that
these indicators reduce fragility. The positive relationship between concentration
and stability may indicate that the banking systems are, on average, quite opaque.
Hence, the results do not necessarily contradict the charter value hypothesis. An
interesting way to extend this research would be to interact the concentration mea-
sure with an indicator of bank transparency. The empirical exploration of the effects
of transparency on the trade-off between banking competition and stability seems
to be one fruitful area for future research.
Another interesting question is whether the competitive effects of public bail-out
policies can be confirmed empirically. Anecdotal evidence on Japan, mentioned
in the introduction, and on France, cited by Acharya (2003), seems to support
our main results. Similarly, the negative stock price reactions of smaller banks to
the announcement of larger banks being “too big to fail” is consistent with our
19
model (see O’Hara and Shaw (1990)). In future research, this question is still to be
systematically analyzed.
The normative implication of our model is that governments should refrain from
bail-out policies, especially in transparent banking markets. The overall welfare
effects of such policies are highly ambiguous, and the effects on the competitor
banks are always detrimental. Only the subsidized bank stands to profit, at the
cost of increased instability in the remaining banking sector. Regulatory initiatives
aiming at greater transparency should be accompanied by a commitment not to bail
out banks. Since our results are driven solely by market expectations of bail-outs
(and not by actual bail-outs), the government should try to build up a reputation of
being committed to a “zero bail-out policy.” Market transparency and government
intervention are substitutes for one another; they should not prevail at the same
time.
A Appendix
A.1 Proofs for opaque banks
Proof of lemma 1: Treating d and y as functions of ρ, we take the derivatives of
(2) and (3) with respect to ρ, and get
y′(ρ)−R(d)− [d + 2 ρ d′(ρ)]R′(d)− d ρ d′(ρ)R′′(d) = 0,[
y − ρR(d)] y′(ρ) p′′(y) + [2 y′(ρ)−R(d)− ρ d′(ρ)R′(d)] p′(y) = 0.
Solving for d′(ρ) and y′(ρ) yields
d′(ρ) =
1
−ρ
p′ [R(d) + 2 dR′(d)] + [y − ρR(d)] [R(d) + dR′(d)] p′′(y)
p′′(y) [y − ρR(d)] [2R′(d) + dR′′(d)] + p′(y) [3R′(d) + 2 dR′′(d)] < 0,
y′(ρ) = p′(y)
R(d) [R′(d) + dR′′(d)]− d [R′(d)]2
same denominator as above
.
All terms in square brackets are positive. Because p′(y) < 0 and p′′(y) ≤ 0, d′(ρ)
must be negative. This proves the first part of the lemma. The denominator of y′(ρ)
is negative and p′(y) is negative; hence y′(ρ) is positive if R(d) [R′(d) + dR′′(d)] −
d [R′(d)]2 is positive. (4) is obtained by a simple transformation. 
Proof of proposition 1: Again we make use of the implicit function theorem. (5)
can be rewritten as
1 = ρ [p(y) + β (1− p(y))]. (A1)
Treating both y and ρ as functions of β and taking derivatives yields
0 = ρ′(β) [p(y) + β (1− p(y))] + ρ [1− p(y) + (1− β) p′(y) y′(ρ) ρ′(β)].
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Now we solve for ρ′(β),
ρ′(β) = − 1− p(y)
(1− β) p′(y) y′(ρ) + ρ−2 .
If y′(ρ) is negative, we see immediately that the whole expression is negative. If
y′(ρ) is positive, the denominator is positive for β = 1, hence the whole expression
is again negative. For smaller β, the denominator shrinks, and it may eventually
become zero. This is the point at which the moral hazard problem becomes so severe
that the bank can no longer collect deposits: The nominal deposit rate would induce
risk-shifting, which in turn would raise deposit rates, and this vicious circle would
not come to an end. Here, ρ′(β) becomes minus infinity. We conclude that in the
region where an inner solution exists, ρ′(β) is negative even if y′(ρ) is positive. This
proves the first part of the proposition.
Since β affects d and y only through ρ, d′(β) can be written as d′(β) = d′(ρ) ρ′(β),
and y′(β) as y′(β) = y′(ρ) ρ′(β). Given our results from lemma 1 and the negative
sign of ρ′(β), we directly get the results from the second part of the proposition. 
Proof of lemma 2: We first show that a bank’s deposit volume shrinks as com-
petitors’ deposit volumes expand. Consider the profits of bank i (i = 1, . . . , n),
Πi = p(yi) di
[
yi − ρi R(di + D−i)
]
,
where D−i is the aggregate deposit volume of bank i’s competitors. For given ρi,
the first-order conditions for bank i’s behavior are
yi − ρi [R(di + D−i) + di R′(di + D−i)] = 0 and
p(yi) + [yi − ρi R(di + D−i)] p′(yi) = 0.
Treating di and yi as functions of D−i and taking the derivatives with respect to
D−i yields
y′i(D−i)− ρi
[
(1 + 2 d′i(D−i))R
′ + (1 + d′i(D−i)) d2 R
′′)
]
= 0,
y′i(D−i) p
′(yi) + p′(yi) [y′i(D−i)− ρi (1 + d′i(D−i))R′]
+ [yi − ρi R] y′i(D−i) p′′(yi) = 0,
where R always stands for R(di + D−i). Now we solve for d′i(D−i), yielding
d′i(D−i) = −
(yi − ρi R) [R′ + di R′′] p′′(yi) + [R′ + 2 di R′′] p′(yi)
(yi − ρi R) [2R′ + di R′′] p′′(yi) + [3R′ + 2 di R′′] p′(yi) ,
y′i(D−i) =
ρi p
′(yi) (R′)2
same denominator
.
All the terms in square brackets are positive, so that d′i(D−i) < 0 and y
′
i(D−i) > 0.
Because the terms in the square brackets in the numerator of d′i(D−i) are smaller
21
than those in the denominator, we have |d′i(D−i)| < 1. The (marginal) contraction
in deposits is smaller than the expansion of D−i.
So far, we have only considered the direct effects of a change in the competitors’
volumes, holding ρi constant. However, a rise in yi will translate into a rise in ρi,
which in turn affects di and yi. According to lemma 1, di will decrease, so the direct
effect is reinforced by the indirect effect, and the overall effect on di is negative,
which proves the first part of lemma 2.
So far, we have shown that an increase in the deposit volume of one bank is ac-
companied by a decrease in deposits at the competitor banks. We now show that
the aggregate effect on deposits is positive. The initial equilibrium levels of deposits
are denoted by d∗1, . . . , d
∗
n. When β1 rises marginally, equilibrium levels adjust to
d∗∗1 , . . . , d
∗∗
n . We have already shown that the direct effect of the rise of β1 is an
expansion of d1, and that this leads to a contraction of d2, . . . , dn. However, this
contraction will never overcompensate the increase in d1: When d2, . . . , dn contract
so much that the original D∗ is reached again, for each bank j = 1, the choice
d∗j would again be optimal. This contradicts the fact that deposit volumes have
decreased. Since bank 1’s deposit volume rises in any case, D has to expand.
As shown above, the contraction of d2, . . . , dn leads to a further expansion of d1,
which again entails a further contraction of d2, . . . , dn. Eventually, this convergence
process comes to an end. Possibly, dj = 0 for some j ∈ {2, . . . , n}. The contrac-
tion of d2, . . . , dn will never overcompensate the expansion of d1, hence in the new
equilibrium
d∗∗1 > d
∗
1, d
∗∗
j < d
∗
j for all j ∈ {2 . . . , n}, and D∗∗ > D∗.
This proves our second assertion. 
Proof of proposition 2: The direct effects of an increase in β1 on bank 1 are the
same as in a monopoly: ρ1 declines, d1 rises, and the effect on y1 is ambiguous.
An application of lemma 2 proves that dj (for j = 1) decreases in reaction to the
increase in d1. Then, using the same procedure as in the proof of proposition 1, we
can show that ρj increases. Writing yj as a function of ρj and D−j, and ρj as a
function of D−j, we take the derivative of (A1) to get
ρ′j(D−j)
ρj
+ ρj (1− βj) p′(yj)
[∂yj
∂ρj
ρ′j(D−j) +
∂yj
∂D−j
]
= 0. (A2)
Solving for ρ′j(D−j) yields
ρ′j(D−j) = −
ρ2j (1− βj) p′(yj) ∂yj/∂D−j
1 + ρ2j (1− βj) p′(yj) ∂yj/∂ρj
. (A3)
The numerator of this expression is negative. Regarding the denominator, we can
make the same argument as above to prove that it is positive for both negative and
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positive y′j(ρj). This proves that ρ
′
j(D−j) is positive. Since βj is constant, it follows
directly that yj must also increase when the competitors’ volume increases (this can
also be seen from (A2)). Note that this is also true when yj decreases in response to
the increase in ρj. The feedback from ρj into yj never overcompensates the direct
effect that was shown to be positive in the proof of lemma 2.
The decrease in the competitor banks’ deposit volumes induces bank 1 to increase its
deposit volume even further, and so on. This reinforces the effect on bank 1’s deposit
volume as well as all the effects on the competitor banks. Similarly, the initial effect
on ρ1 is reinforced by the decrease in D−1: (A3) shows that ρ1 decreases even for
constant β1, so the decrease will be even stronger for rising β1. The initial effect on
risk-taking y1 depends again on the inverse elasticity of the deposit supply. However,
the inverse elasticity of individual supply is smaller than that of aggregate supply,
∂R(D)
∂d1
d1
R(D)
=
(
1 +
∂D−1
∂d1
) R′(D) d1
R
<
R′(D)D
R
=
∂R(D)
∂D
D
R(D)
.
This means that the condition in (4) is more likely to be satisfied. So there is a
stronger tendency for the protected bank to take risks in response to an increase in
ρ1 than in a monopoly. In turn, this implies that there is a lower tendency for the
protected bank to take risks in response to an increase in β1 because this induces
ρ1 to fall. Again the indirect effects reinforce the initial effect. This completes the
proof of proposition 2. 
A.2 Proofs for transparent banks
Proof of proposition 3: The proof of proposition 3 falls into three steps. In a
first step, we characterize the function d(y), in a second step, the function y(d). We
then show how these curves shift in reaction to a change in β.
Step 1. We first show that, for β > 0, d(y) is strictly increasing in the neighborhood
of the optimal y, i. e. dy > 0. If β = 0, then dy = 0.
From the first-order condition in (8), we can derive the slope of the function d(y),
dy =
∂d
∂y
=
1− ρ′(y) [R(d) + dR′(d)]
ρ(y) [2R′(d) + dR′′(d)]
. (A4)
Substituting for ρ(y) in (A4), we get
dy =
β + (1− β) [p(y) + y p′(y)]
2R′(d) + dR′′(d)
=
β + (1− β) [p(y) + y p′(y)]
2R′(d)
if R(d) is linear, as was assumed for the transparent model. If β is small, then
p(y) + y p′(y) ≈ 0. Hence, for β > 0, we get
dy ≈ β
2R′(d)
> 0,
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Figure A1: Risk levels and deposit volumes for varying β in the monopoly
y
d y(d)β=0 y(d)β=0.2y(d)β=0.4
d(y)β=0
d(y)β=0.2
d(y)β=0.4
0.1
0.2
0.5 0.6
Equilibria (i. e. intersections of curves pertaining to the same β) are denoted by the
solid black curve.
and dy = 0 for β = 0, which was to be shown.
Figure A1 displays d(y) for varying β. As predicted, d(y) increases in the neighbor-
hood of the first-best solution; it is locally constant only for β = 0.
Step 2. We now show that, for β > 0, y(d) is strictly increasing, i. e. yd > 0. If
β = 0, then yd = 0.
Plugging ρ(y) into (9), we get
0 = [p(y) + y p′(y)] [p(y) + β (1− p(y))]2 − β p′(y)R(d). (A5)
Taking the derivative with respect to d and assuming linear p(y) yields
0 = yd [2 p
′(y) + y p′′(y)] [p(y) + β (1− p(y))]2
+ [p(y) + y p′(y)] 2 (1− β) yd p′(y) [p(y) + β (1− p(y))]
− β (yd p′′(y)R(d) + p′(y)R′(d))
= yd [2 p
′(y)] [p(y) + β (1− p(y))]2
+ [p(y) + y p′(y)] 2 (1− β) yd p′(y) [p(y) + β (1− p(y))]
− β (p′(y)R′(d)). (A6)
Solving for yd and assuming that β is small, and hence p(y) + y p
′(y) ≈ 0, we get
yd =
β R′(d)
2 [p(y) + β (1− p(y))]2 .
If β > 0, yd > 0; if β = 0, yd = 0, which was to be shown.
Figure A1 displays the function y(d) for different choices of β. y(d) increases in d if
β > 0; it is globally constant at the first-best y if β = 0.
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Step 3. In the final step, we show how the curves d(y) and y(d) move in the
(y, d)-space when β increases. Then we analyze the corresponding changes in the
equilibrium values of y and d.
We first show that, ceteris paribus, the deposit volume d increases as β increases.
Substituting ρ in (8) and taking the derivative with respect to β yields
0 = y (p(y) + β (1− p(y)))−R(d)− dR′(d),
0 = y (1− p(y))− dβ (2R′(d) + dR′′(d)).
For linear R(d), we get
dβ =
y (1− p(y))
2R′(d)
> 0.
Hence the curve d(y) shifts upwards in the (y, d)-space (see figure A1). Next, we
show that the curve y(d) shifts to the right as β rises. Applying the same procedure
as above to (9), we get
0 = [p(y) + y p′(y)] [p(y) + β (1− p(y))]2 − β p′(y)R(d),
0 = yβ [2 p
′(y) + y p′′(y)] [p(y) + β (1− p(y))]2
+ [p(y) + y p′(y)] 2 [p(y) + β (1− p(y))] [1− p(y) + yβ (1− β) p′(y)]
−R(d) [p′(y) + β p′′(y) yβ]. (A7)
If p(y) is linear and if β is not too large, so that p(y) + y p′(y) ≈ 0, (A7) becomes
0 = yβ [−2 p(y)] [p(y) + β (1− p(y))]2 + p(y)R(d),
yβ =
R(d)
2 [p(y) + β (1− p(y))]2 > 0.
The changes in equilibrium values follow directly. Our findings imply that the curves
y(d) and d(y) look as depicted in figure A1: Both curves are increasing, and y(d) is
steeper than d(y) for small β (in fact, the y(d)-curve is nearly vertical, whereas the
d(y)-curve is nearly horizontal). Shifting the two curves in the directions described
above yields the desired result: both y and d must increase in equilibrium when β
goes up.
The effect on ρ remains to be shown. ρ falls if [p(y) + β (1− p(y))] rises. Therefore,
we examine
∂[p(y) + β (1− p(y))]
∂β
= yβ p
′(y) + (1− p(y))− β yβ p′(y)
= 1− p(y) + (1− β) yβ p′(y)
= 1− p(y) + (1− β) p
′(y)R(d)
2 [p(y) + β (1− p(y))]2
β≈0≈ 1− p(y)− R(d)
2 y p(y)
.
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This is positive whenever R(d) is small enough,
R(d) < (1− p(y)) (2 y p(y)). (A8)
This completes the proof of the proposition. 
Proof of lemma 3: In order to derive the slope of the banks’ reaction functions,
we must consider the simultaneous reactions of the optimal yj and dj to an increase
in the competitors’ deposit volume D−j. It can be shown that both curves move
downwards in the (yj, dj)-space as D−j rises. This implies that in principle yj and dj
could go up or down when competitors’ deposits increase. However, as the following
calculations will show, yj unambiguously increases, whereas dj decreases.
yj and dj are determined simultaneously by the following implicit equations:
∂Πj
∂dj
= 0 = yj
(
p(yj) + βj (1− p(yj))
)
+ R(dj + D−j) + dj R′(dj + D−j), (A9)
∂Πj
∂yj
= 0 =
(
p(yj)+yjp
′(yj)
)(
p(yj)+βj (1−p(yj))
)2−βjp′(yj)R(dj+D−j). (A10)
Generally, if we have two equations, F (y, d, ) = 0 and F˜ (y, d, ) = 0, that implicitly
define a dependence d(), then the implicit function theorem implies that
∂d
∂
=
Fy F˜ − F F˜y
Fd F˜y − Fy F˜d
.
Applied to equations (A9) and (A10), we receive
∂dj
∂D−j
= − (1−βj)
(
[5βj+4(1−βj)p(yj)]p(yj)+[βj+2(1−βj)p(yj)]yjp′(yj)
)
+β2j
(1−βj)
(
[11βj+8(1−βj)p(yj)]p(yj)+[3βj+4(1−βj)p(yj)]yjp′(yj)
)
+3β2j
.
If βj is small, we get ∂dj/∂D−j ≈ −1/2 < 0, proving the first part of the lemma.
We still have to show that the aggregate effect on deposits is positive. The argument
here is completely analogous to the one used in the proof of lemma 2, and is therefore
skipped. This completes the proof. 
Proof of proposition 4: Lemma 3 states that competitors react to an expansion
of d1 by contracting dj. From the point of view of bank 1, the interest rate on the
deposit market can be described by a function R˜(d1), which incorporates the other
banks’ reactions to bank 1’s behavior. Since D is larger in the new equilibrium (cf.
lemma 3), R˜(d1) has a positive slope, just as R(D). Therefore, the results for bank 1
from proposition 4 follow directly from proposition 3 if one replaces R(d) with R˜(d).
Hence y1 and d1 increase, whereas ρ1 decreases (for R˜(d1) small enough).
From the point of view of the competitor banks, an increase in β1 is equivalent to a
rise in D−j. Therefore, the reaction of dj is already described by lemma 3. Using a
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procedure similar to the one above, one can also derive the reaction of yj:
∂y
∂
=
Fd F˜ − F F˜d
Fy F˜d − Fd F˜y
,
∂yj
∂D−j
=
βjR
′(D)
(1−βj)
(
[11βj+8(1−βj)p(yj)]p(yj)+[3βj+4(1−βj) p(yj)]yjp′(yj)
)
+3β2j
.
If βj is small (and hence yj is close to the first-best), we get
∂yj
∂D−j
≈ βj R
′(D)
4 p(yj)2
> 0
as long as β > 0. Hence yj increases in reaction to the increase in d1. If β = 0,
risk-taking does not change at all; in that case, competitor banks always choose
the first-best risk level, independent of other banks’ behavior. The reaction of ρj is
obvious. Because the risk level yj rises and βj remains constant, the default premium
ρj must also rise. This completes the proof of the proposition. 
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